Africa has often been seen as a barrier between oceanic systems, and a dividing line within English imperial activity -with colonialism a key strategy to the west and trading favoured to the east of the continent. This article will consider English plans for colonisation on the islands of Madagascar and Assada on the east African coast and question how these can help us understand how the English thought about Africa as a geographical and imagined space within England's developing imperial activities. This, in turn, will support an argument that English activities overseas operated within an environment where information was carefully controlled, created and disseminated to support the aims of the commercial community. Just as the oceanic systems of Asia and the Atlantic were separated through the division of space granted by Queen Elizabeth, the American and Asian continents were also perceived as radically different places for English travellers, merchants and colonists. Colonisation and commodity extraction was a clear aim in America, while trade with established, powerful states
was expected in Asia. Africa sat between these extremes. There was little in the way of extensive colonisation during this period but trading factories similar to those in Asia or the Mediterranean were set up to facilitate access to local commodities-including the trade in slaves that fed colonial expansion in America. 7 The slave trade is perhaps the area of interaction between Africa and the Atlantic world most thoroughly explored by historians: a movement of people that tied the continents together. While undeniably of huge importance, contemporaries did not view Africa as a 'slave continent' or even a continent with defined boundaries, they interpreted Africa through the relationship between the continent and other regions. For contemporaries Africa was not always a clearly defined geographic area, with the North coast often discussed as part of the Mediterranean or the Islamic world, and other parts of the continent unknown-or almost mythological-in the descriptions available to the English public. 8 Additionally, while America was often presented as an 'empty' land by promoters of colonisation, Africa had been home to civilisations that were part of the contemporary admiration for ancient world, particularly in the case of Carthage and Egypt. As John Speed noted in 1631, 'Africa is of great antiquity,' and home to 'her Princes, Pharaoh and his mightie men' but cautioned that much of the continent had long remained unexplored and 'held not habitable… by reason of the extreme heat.' 9 He continues to list seven distinct regions within Africa, from Barbary 'the most noble part of all Africa' to Numidia where the people are judged to be 'idolators, idiots, theeves, murderers.' 10 To these regions Speed suggests 'we adde the Ilands belonging to Africa,' including Madagascar, which he describes as 'rich in all Commodities' but with inhabitants 'very barbarous, most of them blacke, some white there are, supposed to have been transplanted out of China.' 11 Clearly, there was some English awareness of the differences between the numerous states they interacted with across Africa, and the lack of attempts to create a single identity for people in the region reflect the complexity of Africa as a continent in the English imagination. 12 Consequently, while the English idea of Africa contained numerous inaccuracies and generalisations, it did not fit so easily into the same image of an empty continent that was presented in reference to America. 13 This article will assess how English participants in overseas activities-whether trade or colonisation-thought about the island of Madagascar. Attempts at colonisation in the late 1630s and 1640s demonstrate how this region of Africa was conceived as part of Atlantic and Indian Ocean systems rather than a barrier between them, a location connecting the diverse expansion of English trade around the world. Furthermore, promoters of the Madagascan colony were accused of 'Canaanising' the island-that is to say, describing a paradise-and this excessively positive material can shed light on how English imperial promoters imagined Africa. Madagascar can help us to understand how the English perceived Africa within their growing empire, and to recognise that divisions between Atlantic and non-Atlantic endeavours fail to appreciate the entangled qualities of Britain's imperial activities across the globe during the first half of the seventeenth century. Furthermore, we can explore how attempts to create an English empire in Asia, with Madagascar at its centre, were developed in conjunction with 'Canaanising' propaganda, with information (and the lack of it) forming a vital aspect of the ways in which Britain's empire developed during this period.
The first section of this article will consider how the East India Company monopoly in the Indian Ocean was challenged by experienced Atlantic traders, who argued that Company strategy had failed to utilise the colonial strategies that were becoming increasingly successful in the Atlantic. The second section will assess how Madagascar was imagined in England and how the royal court offered fertile ground for grand imperial visions. The third will explore how Madagascar was presented to potential colonists, and the ways in which the attempted colonies on the island sought to replicate English colonial success in America as part of a larger strategy to exploit the Indian Ocean. This discussion seeks to explore how English observers thought about Africa, how the continent sat within the global trading system developing during this period, and how our analysis of the English empire in the seventeenth century can benefit from understanding the connectivity brought about by Africa's role as a hub within the imperial network rather than as a barrier.
William Courteen and the East India Company
From the turn of the seventeenth century, English exploration, trade, and colonisation around the world had been undertaken and controlled within a framework of royal charters. These allowed what were sometimes very small groups to undertake trade to particular regions without fear of domestic competition, keeping prices high and limiting access to overseas opportunities. Monopolies were often justified by the expensive trading infrastructure (trading factories, diplomatic missions and armed convoys) or long years of colonial investment required before profitable commodity extraction came to fruition. From the crown's perspective, monopolies delegated sovereignty to private bodies, enabling risky overseas endeavours and colonial expansion without requiring the input of significant resources by the crown itself. However, the relationship between crown and monopolists was not always positive, and negotiation for privileges was an on-going process between these groups for much of the period. Of course, while monopolists and the crown were able to justify this system, nonparticipants were often very critical, with monopolies coming under attack repeatedly in the first decades of the seventeenth century as one group of monopolists challenged another for control of overseas enterprise. 14 The arguments used against the East India Company monopoly stemmed from the diverse approaches to empire undertaken by different monopoly groups during the first decades of the century, in addition to the perceived failure of the East India
Company in utilising the colonial strategies that were beginning to show great promise in the 25 While these men were all knowledgeable of the East India Company's activities, enabling Courteen to access the key information required to launch a competing enterprise, they brought no additional experience regarding colonisation to the east of Africa. The barrier formed by Africa was breaking down, opening the continent itself to potential settlement-and not simply a trading factory, but a substantial plantation similar to those developing in America. As information spread more freely and among more people in London it is not surprising that strategies were discussed for how to best take advantage of the East India Company's declining control. In particular, the idea of replicating colonial successes of the Atlantic would prove paramount, and using colonies to underpin increased connectivity between the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds was also a key component of this design. Over the next fifteen years, the island of Madagascar would become central to this imagined empire in Asia, America and Africa.
Madagascar and the English court
While Courteen sought to outdo the East India Company in establishing a trading empire in the East Indies, another group of Englishmen dreamt of an even more ambitious plan-centred on Madagascar. In the later 1630s, the island became pivotal to a plan for colonisation in the Indian
Ocean that would do even more than provide an English equivalent to Dutch Batavia or replicate plantation success. For this group, Madagascar was imagined as the seat of a new English empire in Asia, bringing power, prestige and wealth to the Stuart crown.
As a consequence of increasing familiarity with the region, and the breakdown of the East India Company's monopoly, the idea of creating a colony on the island was not necessarily preposterous. Madagascar had been visited by English travellers for decades, serving as a stopping point on the gruelling long voyage to the East Indies (or the return trip). The island was renowned as a suitable location for resupplying and repairing ships in the region, acting as a welcoming gateway between the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. 29 The East India Company had regularly utilised the southern region, around Augustine Bay, for provisioning, and their reports of the island suggested that it was more than just a good place for a brief stop-one particularly positive report going so far as to claim that a stay on the island had cured the voyage's sick seamen. 30 The example and success of other European colonisation efforts provided additional impetus for Britain's own colonisation of Madagascar. In addition to viewing the Dutch success at Batavia as a blue-print for empire in Asia, the need to keep up with the Dutch was apparent in Africa too. Just as the English were beginning to consider colonisation on the east coast of Africa, the Dutch too sought to establish a colony at one of their regular points of call on their voyages east-on the island of Mauritius in 1638. Additionally, increasing French activities in the region, centred on Reunion, would have concerned the would-be English empire builders, who would not want to lose out to these potential competitors. As such, while Courteen's trading activities were aimed primarily at areas further east it is not surprising to see increasing English interest in the east African coast-both as a means of engaging in commercial projects in Asia and Africa, but also to make sure that they did not fall behind their European rivals who were doing the same.
Soon after Courteen established his new trading organisation, Madagascar became the focus of colonial promoters even more closely connected to the crown than his partner Endymion Porter (although Porter was also a key proponent of this scheme too). 31 33 It is also likely that he invested in privateering in some form. 34 Arundel clearly offered more than just a willing ear to Prince Rupert and his plans for overseas adventure. He also brought his own knowledge and experience of the challenges, and potential rewards, that a scheme like the colonisation of Madagascar could offer. That said, his previous ventures were all in arenas where colonisation was the most common strategy undertaken by the English. In
Virginia and Ireland he witnessed the difficulties posed by hostile local populations (violence was endemic in both), but in both places colonisation was supported through the idea of taking 'unused' lands, or civilising 'uncivil' ones. 35 In Madagascar, it seems he found a location that fit similar conceptual parameters, where he believed the North American experience of colonisation could be replicated.
While Prince Rupert's championing of the scheme seems to have dismayed his mother, who sought the aid of Sir Thomas Roe (he had been English ambassador to the Mughal and Ottoman empires, and was an active and trusted member of the court) to persuade her son that the plan was fanciful, support within the court was enthusiastic. What is most interesting, however, is not necessarily that such a bold colonisation scheme piqued the interest of this group, but how the idea of a Madagascan colony was presented. The changing place of the island in the English imagination was keenly expressed in a poem by William Davenant.
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Although not published until 1638, it is likely that the poem was written during the height of excitement generated by Arundel and Rupert. It was dedicated to Davenant's patron, Endymion
Porter, showing again his role as a public figure who supported English endeavours in the Indian Ocean. 37 Twenty-one pages long, Madagascar reflected the imperial imagination of the English court during this period. While clearly hyperbolic, the supposed ease of conquest and colonisation to which it alludes was replicated in the promotional literature that supported colonisation over the following decade. the portrait itself could have been distributed to encourage interest in the colony. 48 In addition to these efforts, Arundel also wrote a treatise encouraging support for a Madagascan colony.
His Declaration Concerning Madagascar was much more balanced than Davenant's poem, but still identified similar reasons for undertaking the venture. 49 Perhaps understanding that previous attempts had lacked reliable information, Arundel was careful to highlight 'being and imagery regarding the island, and the placement of Madagascar at the heart of an imperial idea that moved this east African island to the centre of a combined colonial and trading endeavour designed to connect England's burgeoning global empire.
Planning and executing a colony on Madagascar
While the ambitious plans of Prince Rupert and Arundel came to nothing, the idea of an English colony in Madagascar was firmly planted in the imagination of those seeking to capitalise on Monson presented his tract in the context of colonial experience, but it was followed by two promotional texts that did little to balance expectation with reality-although both highlighted the expertise and accuracy of the authors. This construction of knowledge was not uncommon, and the reasons contemporaries placed exotic information alongside 'accurate' information has been studied by numerous historians. 54 One pamphlet, by Walter Hamond, also from 1640, was based on a three-month stay on the island in the 1630s. In A Paradox, Hamond 64 This disagreement could suggest that the island was difficult to identify as part of one of the traditional continents, and perhaps explains why the many accounts about the island position it in a number of different geographical contexts. Although it had a greater depth to it than other publications, much of the text replicated work of previous authors, with
Madagascar identified as a bountiful land ripe for colonisation. Nevertheless, Boothby and
Hamond's texts do much to reveal the attempts of Courteen Junior and his fellow merchants to obtain greater support for their colony, and that sharing information through these publications was considered a suitable means of doing so.
Within this environment of enthusiasm and support for a potential Madagascan colony, and attempting to find a stable foundation for the trading association he had inherited from his father, William Courteen took the leap and launched a Madagascan colony for the first time in
1644. This was not the only attempt to launch such a venture in the intervening years and
Captain Bond planned to transport 250 settlers to the island, but it seems that pressure from the Company, and its willingness to oppose him, halted his plans-in spite of Hamond's declaration of his role of Governor. 65 The commission for trading in lands not settled by the East India Company which Courteen's father had received included a patent for settling the island. Thus, in August 1644, 140 settlers left England to settle at St. Augustine's Bay on the southwest coast. They left on three ships of Courteen's outgoing fleet-the Hester, the Sun, and the James-and arrived in March 1645, settling in the bay as planned. 66 Considering that English travellers had traded and stayed in the same area in the past, with a positive experience of local conditions, it was hoped that they would be welcomed. However, rather than the dream of Davenant, the colonists experienced something more akin to a nightmare. Scurvy, malaria and other diseases ravaged the settlers, and their crops failed. The indigenous people, rather than welcoming the settlers, did little to assist them. By December only 63 settlers remained, leading the Governor, John Smart to seek an alternative location-although in this too he was unsuccessful. The surviving account of this settlement comes from a pamphlet written by one settler, Waldegrave, upon his return to London, and his scathing description clearly expressed the frustration of the colonists. 67 The Madagascar that permeated English imperial imagination did not exist, and the lack of sustained support for the colony from Courteen or others left it exposed to difficulties that might have been overcome if more accurate information and pragmatic plans had been circulated beforehand.
As a lone project, the 1644 settlement at Augustus Bay lacked the support necessary to sustain an early colony, but like many colonial failures in the seventeenth century, its failure did not put off its proponents. Once again, though, we see a shift in the English approach to the island stemming from a change in the architect of English empire in the region. As Courteen's project failed, both colonially in Madagascar and in his trading pursuits, his interloping Although theoretically acting within the parameters of the Courteen commission, when his plans were discovered by the East India Company they were met with greater anger than the previous colonial attempts on this island. From at least 1645 the Company had been aware that
Thomson was using Madagascar a stopping off point for his voyages, but his desire to establish a plantation was clearly a step too far. 70 However, the weakened state of the East India
Company by this point, and support for Thomson within the organisation, enabled him to propose a merger between the two groups, which lead to an agreement of mutual support. 71 An important element of the merger was the Company's agreement to the colonisation of Assadaor at the very least a 'promise not to discourage any planters who wish to go or to send to Assada.' 72 This colony was one part of an expansive strategy for building an empire that connected Africa and the Indian Ocean, with a second colony planned in Pulo Run. 73 The proponents of this colony approached the challenge with significant experience of colonies in the Atlantic-they were aware of the agricultural goods that could be used to create a sustainable colony and modelled the new colony on Barbados, the Caribbean island where sugar plantations were creating a new type of colony for the burgeoning English empire. 74 While the general idea of settling Madagascar, and places in Asia, was apparent in earlier plans for colonisation, plantations were a different matter. They were high-yield, sophisticated operations, requiring great effort and investment from owners and demanding significant migration-forced or voluntary-to power the labour intensive process. However, trade with India was still considered a further strength for the island, and its position between the two imperial arenas made it particularly attractive-with the benefits of access to the resources required in America made clear. 75 Although it was never printed, planning for the Assada colony was accompanied by a manifesto, but unlike previous ventures regarding this island, the Assada manifesto was more specific as to the requirements of the colony. The first settlements were a clear step, but £5000 a year was specified as necessary to support the colony, Once again, though, the imagination of its proponents outshone the reality of the settlement. While starvation and disease had brought about the destruction of the St.
Augustine's Bay colony, the Assada plantation suffered from the violent attentions of the island's indigenous inhabitants. Soon after landing, an attack killed ten settlers, including Hunt, the governor of the colony. 84 When new settlers arrived in 1650 they found that the original colonists had already moved on in the face on continuing attacks, and by 1651 the island was abandoned. 85 The failure of this second colony on Madagascar was the last attempt to establish a colony in Africa to dominate the trade of Asia, but still the evidence seemed unpalatable for the English. One merchant who found Assada abandoned still thought it necessary to highlight the great fertility of the island, suggesting that it could be secured by 600 men. 86 In spite of the dramatic failure of two colonisation attempts, some of the allure of Madagascar lived on.
Conclusion
After the calamitous attempts to colonise Madagascar in the 1640s, the image of the island in England began to move away from the beatific dream world of Davenport and the paradise of Boothy. The suppositions of these authors had been shown to be unfounded and the misinformation in their texts held to account by survivors of the attempted colony. Upon his return to England, one colonist, Powle Waldegrave, damned Boothby for his description of Madagascar and for 'Canaanising and paradising the glories of it,' persuading fellow Englishman to attempt a colonisation that led to only death and ruin. 87 His pamphlet is dedicated to the East India Company, who saved him from the calamitous colonisation, and is in some respects a defence of the Company-who had been dismissed by Courteen for their very lack of attempted colonisation. He was, following the publication of the pamphlet, rewarded five pounds by the Company. 88 In this pamphlet he traces the information about the island from Arundel and Endymion Porter's early interest through to Courteen and Boothby.
Waldegrave makes it clear that Boothby, and other proponents of a settlement of the island, were to blame for the failure of the colony and the suffering of the colonists. Their 'Canaanising' led to a situation where poor-quality information was the root cause of failure. Over the course of the period discussed in this article, Madagascar in particular, and Africa more broadly, was situated in a mutable place in the English imperial imagination. In 1635 the island was little more than a stopping-off point for other imperial activities, with trade between the West African coast and the developing American colonies clearly the dominant activity undertaken on the continent by English traders. In spite of its location along the shipping route to Asia, Africa was not an important part of the East India Company's strategy.
Instead, it was predominantly a geographical division splitting the Atlantic and Indian Ocean trading worlds. Of course, many merchants had interests on both sides of the divide, and the experiences of eastern trading and western planting were not as divisive within this community as some historians have believed, but Africa did divide the two in terms of approach. As these Waldegrave's cutting account that reveals the poor quality information contained in these other publications. By Canaanising Madagascar, proponents of English colonisation in Africa obtained the support necessary to launch their settlements, but as a consequence of misinformation regarding Madagascar, settlers were unprepared and unable to make the colony a success.
